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Ill-timed, a bombshell, a blow to the rule of law: the judgment of the German
Constitutional Court on the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme has
sent shockwaves through legal and scholarly communities. But after the first
shockwaves have settled, in what direction should the relation between national and
supranational courts move? This post addresses this question from the perspective
of managed mutual recognition. In applying this notion to EU transnational
governance, Kalypso Nicolaïdis has referred to managed recognition as an exercise
in legal empathy mediated through conditions and limits, and resulting from the
‘eternal dance of law and politics’. The notion lends a useful lens to capture the
relation between European top courts. In the version of that relation emerging from
the PSPP judgment, this lens magnifies a disruption, a side effect, and an alternative
course.
In the PSPP judgment, the German Constitutional Court condemns one of the
European Central Bank’s bond purchase programmes, the Public Sector Purchase
Programme, as an instance of economic policy in disguise, exceeding the ESCB’s
monetary policy mandate. For this ultra vires action, the judgment distributes
remedial responsibilities as well as blame. The former mostly fall on the European
Central Bank – called to demonstrate in a ‘comprehensible and substantiated’
manner the programme’s proportionality –, and on the German Constitutional
organs, – required to not implement the programme until that demonstration has
been rendered. Blame goes primarily to the European Court of Justice. The main
fault imputed to the CJEU is having failed to balance the stated objectives of the
PSPP against its economic and fiscal policy effects, thereby betraying the substance
of the principle of proportionality, as well as that of the principle of conferral. The
CJEU is found to have itself acted ultra vires, so that its 2018 ruling in response
to the German Constitutional Court’s preliminary questions does not deserve
observance.
The German Constitutional Court’s act of disobedience brings a hard shake to
a well-tested script governing the relation between the national courts and the
CJEU. As the CJEU likes to reiterate, that relation is grounded in cooperation. It
implies mutual recognition, and mutual respect, of the courts’ respective spheres of
operation. National courts apply EU law and implement its primacy through the dis-
application of conflicting national laws. The CJEU provides guidance when EU law
admits of different interpretations, and is the sole judge of the validity of EU law. 
In its specific relation to the European Court of Justice, the German Constitutional
Court has tended to manage this recognition through attaching to it conditions and
limits. As long as the European Court ensures effective protection of fundamental
rights and safeguards their essential content, the German Court will refrain from
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reviewing European law from a fundamental rights perspective. So proclaimed the
German Court in 1986 in its renowned Solange II judgment. As long as the CJEU
applies recognized methodological principles and its decision is not objectively
arbitrary, it is not for the German Constitutional Court to replace the CJEU’s
interpretation with its own. So clarifies the judgment under discussion. Conditionality
has allowed to cement a form of what Nicolaïdis would call binding trust between
the German court and the European one. To the extent that the CJEU acts within
the rails that the German court has identified, the latter will stand aside. At times the
tone of the German Court has been so deferent to the Court of Justice and its role
to suggest that trust was ripening from binding into blind (e.g. Lisbon judgment par.
60-61; Honeywell par 56-60).
With the PSPP judgment comes the disruption to that tradition of recognition. While
the judgment moves along the tracks of mutual recognition on the surface (‘it is
imperative that the courts exercise their respective mandates in a coordinated
manner’ par. 113, ‘the interpretation and application of EU law, including the
determination of the applicable methodological standards, primarily falls to the
CJEU’ par. 112), an emphasis on limits together with the abandonment of the
usual deferential tone lay the ground for a leap back from recognition (the mandate
conferred upon the Court of Justice is exceeded ‘where the traditional European
methods of interpretation or more broadly the general legal principles that are
common to the laws of the Member States are manifestly disregarded’ par 112). The
judgment does not stop at harshening the management side of recognition. Through
its almost rancorous denunciation of the CJEU’s ‘simply not comprehensible and
thus objectively arbitrary’ interpretation of the Treaties, as well as the accusation
of its having rendered both the principle of proportionality and that of conferral
‘meaningless’, it moves from managed recognition to outright denial of the role of
the Court of Justice. Thereby betraying the long upheld spirit of cooperation among
the courts, and casting a sinister shadow on some of the values – trust and mutual
respect – that are critical to the ethos of integration.
Here comes the side effect. The pernicious results of the German Constitutional
Court judgment have been amply remarked in the first comments. The Court’s
chosen course sounds a warning against the ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase
Programme (see here), legitimates a confrontational attitude on the part of other
national courts at a time when the European rule of law is already under stress,
and represents a short-sighted judicial inlay into policy making choices that the
global emergency makes all the more delicate.  The slip from recognition to denial
highlights a further side effect of the judgment. It destabilizes the European courts’
system precisely when it needs firmness to steady the course of turbulent political
integration.
According to Weiler’s classic vision, in the foundational stage of what is now the
European Union, legal integration compensated for the failures of political integration
at some critical junctures. In this mature stage of integration, and in the context
of political union, democratic and legitimacy concerns leave the courts ill-suited
to play that role. Yet it still falls to them to fill some of the shortfalls of political
integration. This includes empowering the sets of interests that risk falling through
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the cracks of a fragile transnational political process. Cooperation among courts
operating at different levels serves precisely the goal of protecting several classes
of stakeholders, whether savers or consumers, pensioners or workers, creditors or
debtors, protected not on the basis of their national belonging but as members of
a set of European peoples. The German Constitutional Court’s very insistence on
the balancing prong of the test of proportionality (see here for an analysis in this
sense) clumsily hints to the interests of some of those sets of stakeholders. However
in turning its back to inter-court cooperation it betrays an inward-looking conception
of the interests at stake, and a national-focused, rather than transnationally-open,
approach to the judicial review of European law.
A transnationally-open approach to judicial review would have required, at the very
least, to contextualize scrutiny of the ECB measures through a pondered reflection
on the objectives of the common currency, whether economic, political or symbolic,
and their relation to the broader objectives of integration. Such a reflection should
serve not a telos-driven stretch of the ECB’s mandate, but rather provide a means to
stir the debate beyond the parochialism of competing national interests. That stirring
is an important corrective that legal can bring to political integration in difficult times. 
It is true that the CJEU in its vilified 2018 Weiss judgment did little in the way of such
stirring. It hardly engaged with the raison d’etre of a common currency or with the
related interests of the European peoples. The German Constitutional Court hardly
inspires the exercise in its response. Both courts failed to live up to the demands of
legal integration in this sense. The perspective of managed recognition suggests
what the alternative course could have been. Managed mutual recognition entails
the courts holding one another to their respective tasks in a cooperative spirit. Rather
than taking matters into its own hands, the German Constitutional Court could have
nudged the CJEU, maybe in an obiter dictum, to set the analysis of competence
against that broader background. That invitation could have taken the shape of a
further condition attached to recognition. It would have then been open to the CJEU
to take up that suggestion at the next iteration in the review of EU monetary policy
measures, thus respecting the implied condition. 
As recognition goes both ways, the road not taken is still viable. The CJEU could
unilaterally recognize, as a response strategy to the German Constitutional Court,
that national courts need higher level guidance as to the legal context within which
monetary policy choices sit within the project of integration. Review of measures
adopted by the ECB in the context of the pandemic will likely provide opportunities
for the CJEU to impart that guidance. A principled response from Luxembourg could
re-open the dialogue that the German Court has cut short. It could also bring to that
dialogue novel and much needed breadth. The PSPP judgment could remain an
occasional disconnect in a resilient relation. And that course of events could still lead
from outright denial to recognition re-established. 
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